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In 1992 I published a book called Sex and Reason, a primarily law-and-
economics study of human sexual behavior and its regulation. I discussed ho-
mosexuality at some length (see the index references to “Homosexuality” and 
to “Homosexuals”), touching briefly on homosexual marriage.1 Two years lat-
er, Yale Law School Professor William Eskridge published a book advocating a 
right to such marriage: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to 
Civilized Commitment. In the following year I reviewed his book.2 Seventeen 
years later I wrote the opinion for my court invalidating Indiana’s and Wiscon-
sin’s prohibitions of same-sex marriage.3 And on June 26 of this year the Su-
preme Court invalidated such prohibitions in all states.4 The editors of this 
Journal asked me to “re-review” Professor Eskridge’s book in light of the 
change in the law and in my views relating to homosexual marriage since my 
1997 review. 
I am going to start well before 1997. I am going to trace the evolution of my 
thinking about homosexuality back to 1952, when I was thirteen years old. It 
was about then that I first heard about homosexuality, though I don’t remem-
ber how I heard about it; I’m sure it was never mentioned by my parents. I 
considered it incredibly weird. In part for that reason I didn’t think I’d ever ac-
tually meet a homosexual. Not that I felt hostility toward them, any more than 
I did toward Eskimos; they seemed alien, but not threatening, though I recall 
reading Jean-Paul Sartre’s short story The Childhood of a Leader—a harrowing 
tale of homosexual seduction. Eventually I learned about homosexuals such as 
Marcel Proust, Oscar Wilde, Aaron Copland, Benjamin Britten, and Alan Tu-
ring who had made important contributions in a variety of fields. But I still 
thought I’d never meet one, and I went through college without thinking that 
any student or teacher I met was homosexual, though in retrospect I realize 
that one of my finest teachers, and several students I knew, were. As a law pro-
fessor from 1968 to 1981, I met the occasional openly homosexual professor or 
student, but homosexuality as a subject of study did not interest me. 
My 1992 book Sex and Reason, my first academic foray into sex, originated 
in a case my court had heard en banc that involved nude dancing in a strip 
joint—the Kitty Kat Lounge—in South Bend, Indiana. The State wanted to 
forbid such dancing, primarily on the ground that it was likely to promote ille-
gal activity, mainly prostitution. My court held that the dancing was protected 
 
1.  RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).  
2. Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? If So, Who Should Decide? 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1578 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996)). 
3. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
4. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, but the Supreme Court re-
versed.5 I was struck by the ignorance of the lawyers and judges (myself includ-
ed) about erotic dancing, which has a long and interesting history going back 
to Salome’s (probably mythical) “Dance of the Seven Veils,” a striptease, and 
indeed earlier, to the ancient Greeks’ satyr plays. I thought it odd that judges 
should be opining on matters of sex without having any systematic knowledge 
of the subject. During the gestation of our court’s decision I did a good deal of 
research into the history of nude dancing, and of nudity in art more broadly, 
and ended up writing a very long (for me) concurring opinion, though ulti-
mately to no avail.6 And the book followed. 
There was little interest in homosexual marriage in 1992. No state recog-
nized such marriage; the first to do so was Massachusetts in 2004.7 The first 
foreign country to do so was the Netherlands in 2001, though Sweden and 
Denmark already recognized “civil unions,” which gave homosexual couples 
most of the rights of married couples.8 In 1992, public opinion polls revealed 
that only twenty-seven percent of Americans favored allowing homosexual 
marriage;9 today a majority do,10 and the percentage is likely to grow as a result 
of the Supreme Court’s decision, the decline of religious orthodoxy, and the 
“normalization” of homosexuality through marriage. By the last point I mean 
that marriage is regarded as a badge of normalcy; “normal” people marry and 
married homosexuals acquire that badge. 
My book was “pro-homosexual” by the standards of the time. I rejected the 
notion still current then (but no longer) that heterosexuals could be “recruited” 
to be homosexual rather than that homosexual preference is an innate charac-
teristic. I argued in like vein that homosexuals could not be converted to heter-
osexuality. I argued that they should be allowed to serve in the armed forces 
(they weren’t then, at least officially; oddly there had been no bar to their serv-
ing in the armed forces before World War II). 
I was agnostic about whether homosexual marriage should be permitted. I 
listed some objections (of which one, now obsolete and probably silly even 
 
5. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
6. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1089-1104 (Posner, J., concurring). 
7.   See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
8.   Gay Marriage Around the World, BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news 
/world-21321731 [http://perma.cc/CQC2-QFMB]. 
9.   PAUL RYAN BREWER, VALUE WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 24 
(2007). 
10.   Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (July 29, 2015), http://www.pewforum 
.org/2015/07/29/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage [http://perma.cc 
/ML6R-HJGS]. 
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when I made it, was: “Should we worry that a homosexual might marry a suc-
cession of dying AIDS patients in order to entitle them to spouse’s medical 
benefits?”11). I concluded that “[n]one of these points is decisive against per-
mitting homosexual marriage. All together may not be. The benefits of such 
marriage may outweigh the costs.”12 But since, at the time I was writing, au-
thorizing homosexual marriage was simply out of the question, I added that 
“maybe the focus should be shifted to an intermediate solution that would give 
homosexuals most of what they want”—and I pointed to Denmark’s “regis-
tered partnership” and Sweden’s “homosexual cohabitation”13 as examples of 
such a solution. 
Professor Eskridge’s book, published as I said four years after mine, took 
issue with a statement in my book that a number of “incidents of marriage”14—
such as inheritance, social security, income tax, medical benefits, and life insur-
ance—“were designed with heterosexual marriage in mind, more specifically 
heterosexual marriages resulting in children. They may or may not fit the case 
of homosexual marriage; they are unlikely to fit it perfectly. Do we want homo-
sexual couples to have the same rights of adoption and custody as heterosexual 
couples?”15 Eskridge’s rebuttal was persuasive: “[T]he law of marriage focuses 
on the interpersonal commitment and not the heterosexuality of the partners. 
To the extent the law of marriage focuses on children (by and large it does 
not), it is agnostic as to where the children come from.”16 As for my concern 
with a homosexual marrying “a succession of dying AIDS patients,”17 Eskridge 
brushed that off as a “lavender herring.”18 
He granted that Denmark’s “registered partnership” law would give homo-
sexual couples most of the rights of married couples (except adoption), but said 
he “would oppose a halfway house to marriage,”19 which was his characteriza-
 
11. POSNER, supra note 1, at 313. More substantial reasons that I noted for not permitting homo-
sexual marriage, though I no longer think them valid, are that homosexual marriages would 
not be as stable or rewarding as heterosexual ones and that allowing homosexuals to adopt 
children would be problematic. See id. at 312-13. 
12. Id. at 313. 
13. Id. 
14. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO 
CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 116 (1996) (quoting POSNER, supra note 1, at 313).  
15. POSNER, supra note 1, at 313. 
16. ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 118. 
17. POSNER, supra note 1, at 313. 
18. ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 119. I don’t know what a “lavender herring” is, but it doesn’t 
sound good. 
19. Id. at 121. Oddly, Professor Eskridge’s book gives little weight to adoption rights as an im-
portant element of marriage for homosexuals. There is no index reference to “adoption.” 
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tion of the Danish law,20 and he went on to argue for a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage, making almost all the arguments that have been advanced 
in the recent wave of litigation culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.21 
In my review I called his book “a work of deep and scrupulous (though not 
flawless) scholarship—unstrident, unpolemical, and written with extreme lu-
cidity and simplicity so that it is fully accessible to the nonlawyer. Except for 
the treacly vignette of lesbian love with which the book opens, it is a model of 
advocacy scholarship.”22 I noted that he argued both “for legislative reform: 
state marriage statutes (or their interpretation) should be changed to permit 
people of the same sex to marry . . . [and] that the courts in the name of the 
Constitution should force acceptance of same-sex marriage on all the states at 
once.”23 I said that he’d made a powerful argument for legislative reform and 
that I would not be troubled if a state were to be persuaded by it, but that I 
found his constitutional case unconvincing. Distinct from either point, I noted 
his questionable historical claims, such as that “we can infer that ‘same-sex in-
timacy was common in [ancient] Egypt’ from the denunciation of the Egyptian 
practice of same-sex marriage in Leviticus.”24 
I said,  
I do think (Eskridge is vague about this) that homosexual couples 
ought not be granted the identical rights of adoption as heterosexual 
couples without further study of the effects of such adoption—not on 
the sexual orientation of the child, which I believe to be invariant to the 
adoptive parents’ orientation as to other environmental factors, but on 
the child’s welfare in the broadest sense. Apart from this reservation, I 
find Eskridge’s argument for recognizing homosexual marriage quite 
persuasive—but only as an argument addressed to a state legislature.25  
 
20. Id. at 122. 
21.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
22. Posner, supra note 2, at 1578 (footnote omitted). 
23. Id. at 1578-79. 
24. Id. at 1580 (alteration in original) (quoting ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 19). This is an exam-
ple of a weakness inherent in advocacy scholarship, a type of scholarship signaled by the first 
words of his book’s title, “The Case for.” He acknowledges in his book that he is himself ho-
mosexual, which means that he has a personal stake in the legal position that he advocates, 
regardless of whether he has any interest in being married; allowing homosexual marriage is 
bound to boost the social status of homosexuals.  
25. Id. at 1584. I don’t know why I was worried about homosexuals adopting children. In the 
opinion for my court invalidating Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s prohibitions on same-sex mar-
riage, I emphasized the importance of adoption by homosexual couples of children who 
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As a constitutional argument, I said, it was not convincing, for though 
Eskridge had made “good lawyers’ arguments,” he had made 
the tacit assumption that the methods of legal casuistry are an adequate 
basis for compelling every state in the United States to adopt a radical 
social policy that is deeply offensive to the vast majority of its citizens 
and that exists in no other country of the world, and to do so at the be-
hest of an educated, articulate, and increasingly politically effective mi-
nority that is seeking to bypass the normal political process for no bet-
ter reason than impatience, albeit an understandable impatience. 
(Americans are an impatient people.) A decision by the Supreme Court 
holding that the Constitution entitles people to marry others of the 
same sex would be far more radical than any of the decisions cited by 
Eskridge. Its moorings in text, precedent, public policy, and public 
opinion would be too tenuous to rally even minimum public support. It 
would be an unprecedented example of judicial immodesty. That well-
worn epithet “usurpative” would finally fit . . . . No nation in the world, 
no state of the United States with the uncertain and incipient exception 
of Hawaii (by no means a typical state, in any event), recognizes homo-
sexual marriage and equates it to heterosexual marriage. An over-
whelming majority of the American people are strongly opposed to it; 
even the homosexual community is divided over it (hence chapter 3 of 
Eskridge’s book). A complex and by no means airtight line of argument 
would be necessary plausibly to derive a right to homosexual marriage 
from the text of the Constitution and the cases interpreting that text—a 
tightrope act that without a net constituted by some support in public 
opinion is too perilous for the courts to attempt. Public opinion may 
change—Eskridge’s book may help it change—but at present it is too 
firmly against same-sex marriage for the courts to act. 
 . . . [P]ublic opinion is not irrelevant to the task of deciding whether a 
constitutional right exists. When judges are asked to recognize a new 
constitutional right, they have to do a lot more than simply consult the 
text of the Constitution and the cases dealing with analogous constitu-
tional issues. If it is truly a new right, as a right to same-sex marriage 
would be, text and precedent are not going to dictate the judges’ con-
clusion. They will have to go beyond the technical legal materials of de-
cision and consider moral, political, empirical, prudential, and institu-
 
would otherwise be confined to foster care. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 654, 662-64 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
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tional issues, including the public acceptability of a decision recognizing 
the new right.  
Reasonable considerations also include the feasibility and desirability of 
allowing the matter to simmer for a while before the heavy artillery of 
constitutional rightsmaking is trundled out. Let a state legislature or ac-
tivist (but elected, and hence democratically responsive) state court 
adopt homosexual marriage as a policy in one state, and let the rest of 
the country learn from the results of its experiment. That is the demo-
cratic way, and there is no compelling reason to supersede it merely be-
cause intellectually sophisticated people of secular inclination will find 
Eskridge’s argument for same-sex marriage convincing . . . . 
 . . . Similarly, if no other country in the world authorizes such a thing, 
this is a datum that should give pause to a court inclined to legislate in 
the name of the Constitution . . . .  
 . . . The country is not ready for Eskridge’s proposal, and this must 
give pause to any impulse within an unelected judiciary to impose it on 
the country in the name of the Constitution.26 
In retrospect I don’t like the first quoted paragraph of the preceding pas-
sage, especially the reference to “impatience.” But I think the rest of that pas-
sage was okay for its time, and that a decision by the Supreme Court in 1997 
establishing a right to homosexual marriage in all states would have been a 
mistake. A change in public opinion was required to make the judicial creation 
of such a right acceptable. The change occurred. By 2011 a majority of Ameri-
cans supported authorizing same-sex marriage. On the eve of the Obergefell de-
cision, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia recognized same-sex mar-
riage, though mainly as a result of lower-court decisions based on implications 
of the United States v. Windsor decision discussed below.27 By 2015 the time was 
ripe for the Supreme Court to lay the issue to rest. 
Between 1997, when I reviewed Eskridge’s book on same-sex marriage, and 
2013, when I reviewed two books (neither by him) on same-sex marriage,28 my 
 
26. Posner, supra note 2, at 1584-87 (footnote omitted). 
27.   The State of Marriage Equality in America, MD. OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (April 2015), http://www 
.oag.state.md.us/reports/the%20state%20of%20marriage%20equality%20in%20america 
%202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VJF-TH8P]. 
28. Richard A. Posner, How Gay Marriage Became Legitimate: A Revisionist History of a Social Rev-
olution, NEW REPUBLIC (July 24, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113816/how 
-gay-marriage-became-legitimate [http://perma.cc/2ZS7-GCWZ] (reviewing MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
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interest in the subject flagged. Yet in a book review published in 2003 (which I 
had completely forgotten until September 2015), I discover with some surprise 
that I opposed, not homosexual marriage as such, but the creation by the Su-
preme Court of a con stitutional right to such marriage, on grounds not dis-
similar to those advanced by the dissenters in Obergefell. In a typical passage I 
said,  
I am dubious about interpreting the Constitution to authorize the Su-
preme Court to make discretionary moral judgments that offend domi-
nant public opinion. Nothing in the Constitution or its history suggests 
a constitutional right to homosexual marriage. If there is such a right, it 
will have to be manufactured by the justices out of whole cloth. The ex-
ercise of so freewheeling a judicial discretion in the face of adamantly 
opposed public opinion would be seriously undemocratic. It would be a 
matter of us judges, us enlightened ones, forcing our sophisticated 
views on a deeply unwilling population. It would be moral vanguard-
ism.29 
At the time I wrote that review, there was still overwhelming public opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage, in light of which it might indeed have been impru-
dent for the Court to have declared a constitutional right to it. By 2013, when I 
wrote the other review that I’ve mentioned,30 public support had swung 
strongly in favor of allowing such marriages. But, as I said, my interest in the 
subject had flagged, and the books I reviewed focused on the inconclusive 
question of whether a Supreme Court decision creating a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage would cause a backlash that might undermine the Court’s 
authority and have other untoward consequences. 
My same-sex marriage case, Baskin v. Bogan,31 invalidating as I said earlier 
the Indiana and Wisconsin prohibitions of same-sex marriage, was argued in 
August 2014 and decided in September, just months before Obergefell. By the 
summer of 2014, the tide was running strongly in favor of invalidating such 
prohibitions, although it was not certain that the Supreme Court would go 
with the tide. I do think the change in public opinion was decisive for all the 
courts that ruled in favor of creating a constitutional right to same-sex mar-
 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2012) and JASON PIERCESON, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: THE ROAD TO THE SUPREME COURT (2013)). 
29. Richard A. Posner, Wedding Bell Blues: Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution, NEW REPUB-
LIC (Dec. 22, 2003), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/wedding-bell-blues [http://perma 
.cc/AP8F-UZEA] (reviewing EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITU-
TION (2004)). 
30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
31. 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); see also supra text accompanying note 3. 
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riage. Law is not a science, and judges are not calculating machines. Federal 
constitutional law is the most amorphous body of American law because most 
of the Constitution is very old, cryptic, or vague. The notion that the twenty-
first century can be ruled by documents authored in the eighteenth and mid-
nineteenth centuries is nonsense. 
The arguments against same-sex marriage were never strong. They didn’t 
need to be when there was overwhelming passionate objection to such mar-
riage. When the objection faded (not completely, but to a great extent, and 
with remarkable speed), the absence of strong arguments against same-sex 
marriage, and the presence of strong arguments in favor of it, became the deci-
sive factors guiding judicial action. 
But I want to say a little more about the change in public opinion that set 
the stage for Obergefell, and this will allow me to return to where I started in 
this Review, with my youthful discovery that there was this strange phenome-
non called homosexuality. In those days a great many homosexuals concealed 
their homosexuality from heterosexuals in order to avoid the discrimination 
against homosexuals that was then rampant. The result was that those who 
flaunted their homosexuality—whose mannerisms or dress or occupations sig-
naled homosexuality—were taken by heterosexuals to be typical of homosexu-
als, and were derided, especially since, in a prissier era than today, homosexual 
sex was criminalized by many states. (I am speaking primarily of male homo-
sexuals, who have always received more critical attention than lesbians.) But 
beginning in the 1960s with the Alfred Kinsey reports revealing a greater 
amount of promiscuity than conventional people realized existed, there was a 
loosening of sexual mores in general and among its effects was an increasing 
tolerance of homosexuals. Gradually, as that tolerance grew, fewer homosexu-
als bothered concealing the fact of their being homosexual. As homosexuals not 
readily recognizable as such by reason of mannerism, dress, or occupation be-
gan to acknowledge, or at least cease denying or trying to conceal, their homo-
sexuality, heterosexuals discovered that most homosexuals are indistinguisha-
ble in any respect except sexual preference from heterosexuals; and so it 
became difficult to understand why they should be discriminated against. The 
Supreme Court, first in Romer v. Evans, which held that a state could not enact 
a law forbidding municipalities to provide protection against discrimination 
against homosexuals,32 then in Lawrence v. Texas, which invalidated laws crim-
inalizing homosexual sex between consenting adults,33 and then in United States 
v. Windsor,34 invalidating the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which had de-
 
32. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
33. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
34. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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nied federal marriage benefits to homosexual couples married in states that au-
thorized same-sex marriage, set the stage for the Obergefell decision, a decision 
anticipated by a number of lower federal courts, and also state courts, after 
Windsor. Indeed Justice Scalia, in his characteristically scathing dissenting 
opinion in Windsor, said that the majority opinion signaled that the Court 
would invalidate all state laws forbidding same-sex marriage.35 And sure 
enough, two years later, in Obergefell the five-Justice majority in Windsor con-
firmed Justice Scalia’s fears. By this time, the majority could be confident that a 
combination of public opinion increasingly favorable to allowing same-sex 
marriage with the flood of lower-court cases invalidating state laws forbidding 
such marriage would deflect the indignation that such a decision would have 
aroused in 1996, or perhaps in any year before 2015. And so it has proved. 
Justice Kennedy, Catholic and conservative, the critical swing vote and ma-
jority-opinion author in the cases involving homosexual rights, deserves great 
credit for his political and intellectual independence in regard to homosexuals. 
Big business also deserves credit. The biggest U.S. corporation (net worth sev-
en hundred billion dollars) is Apple. Its CEO, Timothy Cook, is an “out of the 
closet” homosexual. It is hard to disrespect such a star; and, as far as I know, 
no one does. Many other prominent people are openly homosexual as well. Big 
business (and small business as well), regardless of the sexual preferences of its 
CEOs, dislikes discrimination against homosexuals (including denial of mar-
riage rights) because homosexuals tend to have above average income and edu-
cation, making them attractive to business as customers and employees. Busi-
ness is also concerned that hostility to homosexuals will turn off prospective 
customers and employees who, though heterosexual themselves, consider, as 
increasingly they do, such hostility to be a form of bigotry. 
So Eskridge’s position has triumphed. It’s a shame that Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion did not cite his book. Nor did any of the four dissents cite his book; 
nor for that matter had I cited it in my opinion in Baskin. I had forgotten his 
book, forgotten my review of it, and forgotten what I had said about same-sex 
marriage in Sex and Reason and the subsequent book reviews that I mentioned 
here. A prophet before his time, William Eskridge has the satisfaction of having 
finally been vindicated. 
 
 
35. Id. at 2709-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
